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NOTES
voluntary dismissal rule, 1.35 (b), and, realizing the confusion in the
area of the non-suit and the possibility of disposing of the whole
common law concept by repeal of two statutes, sought help directly
from the legislature.59 The bill was defeated in the committee because of unfamiliarity with the problem. 60 It is reasonably certain
that it will be introduced again at the next session of the legislature
and will probably be pursued until passed. Until there is legislative
action, however, Florida courts must still contend with the complexities of the non-suit.
C. PARKHILL MAYS, JR.

COOPERATIVE APARTMENTS-A

LEGAL HYBRID

Bill Buyer has recently retired to Miami from an active business
in New York. He was successful in New York and now seeks to end
his days in the Florida sunshine, as seen through the picture window
of a luxurious, centrally air-conditioned home. Buyer still hankers,
however, to be near the heart of a large city; and luxurious homes
near the heart of Miami are quite a problem, even for the wealthy.
After inquiring for several days, he saw a brochure in a local realty
office lauding a new cooperative apartment. The price was reason-

able for a man of Buyer's means (only $39,000 unfurnished), and
the location was perfectl
Buyer made an appointment with Sam Seller to discuss the merits
of the Gilded Arms Apartments. At the meeting Seller skillfully
pointed out the advantages of cooperative apartment life and soon
dissolved all but one of Buyer's apprehensions.
Buyer: "How can I be assured that some undesirable person won't
move in next door?"
Seller: "Initially you will be protected by seeing the list of your
neighbors. You'll have a chance to meet them and find out if they
are 'your kind of people.' Up to this point I, as builder-seller, will
insure your satisfaction. Thereafter you will be protected against
5SAs related in an interview with Senator J. Emory Cross.
co"Committee Report 'Jud. A'; Unfavorable, April 29."
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anyone's selling to undesirables by the screening powers granted the
board of directors, whom you folks will elect. It works this way.
Technically you and your neighbors will not own an apartment. You
will own shares of stock in the Gilded Arms Apartments, Inc. This
ownership entitles you to a proprietary lease. Your neighbors can
sell their stock freely, but they cannot assign their leases without twothirds approval of the capital stock. Obviously no one would buy
the stock unless he could get a lease to go with it. Since you stockholders can withhold your consent to sublease or assign for any
reason whatsoever, no undesirables!"
Buyer: "That sounds pretty good, but before I invest my money I
want to be sure you're right. Will it stand up in court?"
Seller: "You can bet it will."
As a matter of fact, nearly 40,000 persons in Florida have already
bet one-half billion dollars that Seller is right;' that they as apartment
"owners" in cooperative apartment corporations can absolutely control
who will or will not be their cotenant-next-door-neighbors. This note
considers the conclusiveness of Seller's opinion.
THE NATURE OF COOPERATIVE APARTMENTS

A cooperative apartment building is normally one owned by a
corporation. The shareholders are the tenants of the individual apartments. These cooperative living schemes are usually initiated by a
person called the "promoter," who leases or purchases land on which
the apartment is erected, forms the corporation, and solicits stockholders - the prospective tenants. The corporation, with its assets
derived from the sale of stock, gains an assignment of the leasehold, or
leases the property directly from the promoter, or purchases the prop2
erty outright.
Although the purchaser is encouraged to believe that he "owns"
his apartment, the apartment is not actually sold to him. He obtains
' '3
stock in a corporation and a proprietary lease on "his apartment.
'Compiled from figures contained in SELF and MCGRATH, FLORIDA's FABULOUS
CO-OPERATIVE APARTMENT Boom (1958).
2See Anderson, Cooperative Apartments in Florida, 12 U. MIAMI L. REV. 13, 16

(1957).
3Hicks v. Bigelow, 55 A.2d 924 (Munic. App. D.C. 1947).
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Yet the proprietary lease is necessarily an integral part of the stock
and separation of the two is illusory, a point to be given further
consideration.
Cooperative apartments as considered herein are luxury items
that must compete on the open market. Location, design, pecuniary
advantage of single unit construction, and low maintenance cost are
factors that contribute to the enthusiasm needed to initiate and
maintain a successful enterprise, 4 but cooperative apartments are not
to be confused with low cost housing developments sponsored by fraternal orders, veteran organizations, or governmental agencies. 5 Unlike these, cooperative apartments are specifically designed for the
dual purpose of luxurious living and the return of a substantial profit
to the promoter. Consequently, most purchasers, like Buyer, are not
solely bargain hunters. Rather, purchasers when selecting cooperative
apartments are motivated by personal fancy, an intangible desire
based upon Seller's assurance that the cotenant-next-door-neighbor, as
in an exclusive subdivision, will be a person of the purchaser's own
economic, racial, and social background-one who can neither sell
nor sublet without the consent of all or at least a majority of the
shareholders or their chosen representatives. Seller makes these assurances in reliance on the assumption that restrictive covenants
freely entered into will be honored by the judiciary. Should this
assumption prove fallacious, he argues, cooperative apartments would
be largely denuded of their present sales appeal.
The idea of cooperative apartments is not new to Florida; it can
be traced back to the early 1920's. It has been within the past ten
years, however, that the cooperative apartment in Florida has gained
economic significance. With the increased investment in these entities, a commensurate amount of legal activity has arisen - much of it
conventional and familiar, much unique and yet to be explored.
At the present time the Gold Coast of Florida is the site of
ninety-five per cent of the 4,247 cooperative apartments in the state;
seventy-six per cent are in Broward County, with Dade and Palm
Beach counties accounting for nineteen per cent; and the remaining
five per cent are located on the Gulf from Clearwater to Naples.6 The
attractiveness of cooperative apartment living, however, is not so peculiarly connected with a geographic locality that the spread of the
4See Note, 61 HARv. L. Ray. 1407 (1948).
5See Anderson, supra note 3, at 15.
6See SEF and McGRATH, op. cit. supra note 1, at 18.

Published by UF Law Scholarship Repository, 1960

3

Florida Law Review, Vol. 13, Iss. 1 [1960], Art. 4
UNIVERSITY OF FLORIDA LAW REVIEW

movement will be limited to the lower east coast; the desirable features would be amenable to many localities in the state. Consequently,
Buyer's question is important to all Florida attorneys.
THE LEGAL LABYRINTH

"The co-operative plan is sui generis. There are elements of ownership as well as stock and leasehold rights."7 The significance of this
statement is best presented by reviewing the broad conceptual patterns of the law of (1) stock transfer and (2) leasehold rights. It is
to the formulae provided by these established bodies of law that the
judiciary has looked in developing its approach to the issue of restrictive covenants in cooperative apartments.
Stock Transfer Rules
Shares of stock in a corporation are personal property, which the
owner has an inherent right to sell and transfer at will, 8 and as such
they are not subject to restrictions on free alienation. 9 A well-recognized exception to this generalization is that "reasonable restrictions
upon the transfer of stock of a corporation, which are necessary to
accomplish the purpose of the organization, are valid and within the
powers usually delegated to corporations by the laws of most states."1°
Reasonable restrictions on the transfer of stock are usually closely associated with the maintenance of the corporate structure; they serve
the purpose of enabling the corporation to know its shareholders
and to prevent transfers in derogation of its rights." Beyond these
restrictions, courts have "jealously guarded facilities for the transfer
of title, and all unreasonable attempts to restrain the right to pass
title have been declared void as against public policy."12 This suggests that the right of stock transfer has been regarded by the ju'in re Weisner v. 791 Park Avenue Corp., 7 App. Div. 2d 75, 84, 180 N.Y.S.2d
734, 743 (1st Dep't 1958).
sSee 12 FLETCHER, CYCLOPEDIA OF PRIVATE CORPORATIONS 284 (rev. ed. 1957).
9E.g., People ex rel. Malcolm v. Lake Sand Corp., 251 Ill. App. 499 (1929); Miller
v. Farmer's Milling & Elevator Co., 78 Neb. 441, 110 N.W. 995 (1907). The cases
are collected in Note, 65 A.L.R. 1159, 1165 (1930). But see Note, 54 HARV. L. REV.
466 (1941).
1023 TULANE L. REV. 569 (1949). See also Lawson v. Household Finance Corp.,
17 Del. Ch. 343, 152 At. 723 (Sup. Ct. 1930).
1lCHRsTY and MCLEAN, THE TRANSFER OF STOCK 72

12Howe v.

(2d ed. 1940).
Roberts, 209 Ala. 80, 81, 95 So. 344, 345 (1923).
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diciary as an inherent right of ownership; consequently, the stockholder may generally do as he pleases with his stock.
Leasehold Rights
In a landlord-tenant relationship, the lessee has a property interest
which gives him the right to possession of the premises and the right
to maintain trespass even against the lessor. 13 Yet the leasehold interest of the lessee cannot be freely assigned if the landlord includes
within the lease an express restriction against such an assignment.4
"When a lease contains a covenant restricting assignment or subletting without the landlord's consent, the landlord can withhold his
consent arbitrarily."'15 The common law view regarding restrictive
16
covenants is well summarized by a New York court:
"The provision against subletting without consent was a condition of the granting of the lease to the plaintiff, and he cannot now be heard to complain. The defendant was under no
duty to give its consent, and if desired could even arbitrarily
and unreasonably withhold its consent."
The Hybrid
What would be the result of the creation of a new hybrid interest
containing elements of both stock and leasehold rights? The owner's
rights would be significantly affected by the category into which his
interests were put. If his interests were catalogued "stock," for example, the rule of free alienation would apply. On the other hand,
if they were classed as a leasehold, the landlord-tenant rule applicable
to leases would apply, and he could be restricted in the alienation of
his interests.
The cooperative apartment occasions a meeting of these two mutually divergent theories and creates a legal hybrid. The cooperative
apartment owner-lessee possesses both stock and a lease. The apartment house is incorporated, and the stockholder has shares of stock
in the corporation; yet he does not own an apartment. He is a lessee
13See I RAscH, LANDLORD AND TENANT 10 (Ist ed. 1950).
141d. at 118.
'151d. at 117; see Note, 11 U. FLA. L. Rlv. 344, 346 (1958).
'GOgden v. Riverview Holding Corp., 134 Misc. 149, 150, 234 N.Y. Supp. 678,
679 (Sup. Ct.), aff'd, 226 App. Div. 882, 235 N.Y. Supp. 850 (Ist Dep't 1929).

Published by UF Law Scholarship Repository, 1960

5

Florida Law Review, Vol. 13, Iss. 1 [1960], Art. 4
UNIVERSITY OF FLORIDA LAW REVIEW
of his lessor board of directors. By one rationale, then, he is merely
a lessee, subject to arbitrary but legal restraints on the sale of his
interest. By the other rationale he is a shareholder whose interest is
personal property and freely marketable.
Will a court, placing emphasis upon the stock, treat the whole
as personal property, allowing free sale? Or will the court, convinced by the directors that the analogy to that of the law of landlord-tenant is stronger, allow carte blanche restraints on the sale of
the stock interest, as if it were a simple lease?
One solution is to apply one rule to the stock and the other to
the lease. This provides a satisfactory resolution of conflicting con1
ceptual notions, but it is a false dichotomy. 7
PertinentLitigation
The first leading case on this question was brought before the
New York courts in 1939. In Penthouse Properties v. 1159 Fifth
Avenue, Inc. Mrs. Harris owned 777 shares of the defendant corporation's 15,100 shares of capital stock, subject to the following restriction:' s
"X. That Lessee shall not cause or permit any of his stock
and/or this lease . . . to be assigned . . .. except [as in Art.
XVII (d) ] . .. with the consent of the Lessor . . .; the consent
of Lessor to be by authority of the Board of Directors or, upon
refusal thereof by said Board, by authority of the holders of
two-thirds of the capital stock ...."
Mrs. Harris wrote the board of directors that she intended to dispose of her stock and offered first refusal to the board. Upon the
board's refusal either to buy or give permission to sell, Mrs. Harris
conveyed her interest in the corporation to a third party in defiance of
the above restrictions.
In upholding the defendant cooperative corporation's board of
directors the court pointed out that tenant stockholders are concerned
with the purchase of a home. "The stock was incidental to that purpose and afforded the practical means of . . .sharing proportionately
17See Penthouse Properties v. 1158 Fifth Avenue, Inc., 256 App. Div. 685, 11
N.Y.S.2d 417 (lst Dep't 1939).
181d.

at 689, 11 N.Y.S.2d at 420.
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the assessments for maintenance and taxes .. . ."19 The court defined
the issue by noting: "We are now required to decide within which
of these divergent principles the co-operative apartment house restrictive plan is to be classified." 20 The court concluded by saying
that "the special nature of the ownership of co-operative apartment
houses by tenant owners requires that they be not included in the
general rule against restraint on the sale of stock in corporations organized for profit."21
It was 1959 before another case directly on point arose. In Weisner
v. 791 Park Corp.22 the plaintiff contracted with an owner-lessee for
the purchase of his interest in the defendant cooperative corporation.
The contract was made conditional, however, upon approval of the
plaintiff by the defendant's board of directors, as required by the
corporation's charter and bylaws. Upon the board's disapproval of
the plaintiff, the owner-lessee considered the contract discharged and
prepared to sell to another party suggested by the board of directors.
The plaintiff, claiming that consent was denied him for reasons of
personal vendetta, entered motion for a temporary injunction to
23
maintain the status quo. The trial court denied the motion, saying:
"In Penthouse . . . the Appellate Division in this depart-

ment upheld the validity of a restriction requiring the consent
of the board of directors to the transfer of stock and a proprietary lease, in the case of a co-operative apartment house.
. . . The Appellate Division applied the rule relating to transfers of leases rather than the rules relating to alienation of
corporate stock."
The appellate court reversed the trial court and granted the
plaintiff's injunction, saying, "[M]ay the consent of the directors or
stockholders to a proposed sale be withheld from a proprietary lessee
arbitrarily and without justification? This question was posed but
not passed upon by this court in Penthouse Properties, Inc.."24
25
Nevertheless, the court concluded:
i9ld. at 692, 11 N.Y.S.2d at 423.

2old. at 691, 11 N.Y.S.2d at 422.
21d. at 692, 11 N.Y.S.2d at 423.
227 App. Div. 2d 75, 180 N.Y.S.2d 734 (1st Dep't 1958).
2312 Misc. 2d 774, 177 N.Y.S.2d 887, 888 (Sup. Ct. 1958) (Emphasis supplied.)
247 App. Div. 2d at 80, 180 N.Y.S.2d at 739.
251d. at 81, 180 N.Y.S.2d at 740.
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"It is sufficient to state that we do not embrace in its entirety

the rule that the owner under any and all circumstances may
arbitrarily refuse consent to a proprietary lessee to the sale of
his lease and stock. As suggested in the Penthouse case, supra,
justification for such action would ordinarily present a factual
issue."
Regardless of whether Bill Buyer's potential "interest" in Gilded
Arms Apartment is a lease, stock, or a hybrid of both, the rule applicable to the alienation of such interests is important for one reason:
Was Sam Seller right in saying that Buyer and one third of his
stock-holding friends could conclusively control the admission of new
tenants by depriving a tenant-vendor of consent to sell to those deemed
undesirable?2r Weisner, reversing what was thought to be an unqualified "yes" in Penthouse,held that it depends upon the individual
circumstances; Buyer may not, under any circumstances, unreasonably
withhold approval of vendees. How realistic then, was Sam Seller's
reassurance to Bill Buyer?
Since "reasonable" restraints are no longer - if they ever were unconditional authority for a board of directors to thwart alienation
by a tenant-stockholder, there must at least be ostensible justification
for denial of consent to transfer ownership. There was no justification
whatever for the denial of consent in Weisner. The vendor was denied consent to sell her stock simply because the cooperative apartment corporation's treasurer and board member disliked the vendee's
brother-in-law and would likely have made a commission on the sale
of the interest to someone else. There was no evidence that the
vendee's presence would lower the socio-economic status of the defendant corporation and consequently impose a forfeiture upon the
other stockholders. If the vendee had been insolvent or irresponsible,
denial of consent apparently would have been a proper exercise of
the board's discretion, because the financial default of any one tenant
would have resulted in increased expense to his cotenants.
The above examples of restraint on a vendor's right to sell represent the two extremes. Such rulings by a board of directors are all
but subject to empirical tests of reasonableness. Between these
extremes is a ladder of restraints, with intervening rungs of denials
26Attention is called to the fact that when a two-thirds vote is required for
permission to alienate one's interest, any number over one third can effectively
block all requests.
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based first upon character, then reputation, then relative social position, and ultimately membership in or affiliation with a particular
race or creed. The substantive question, not answered in Weisner,
remains: How far may a sincerely motivated board of directors expect
to descend this ladder and still be supported by the judiciary in the
enforcement of arbitrary denials of consent to sell? This is Buyer's
question of Seller: Will a court be likely to support a board's denial
of a vendor's request to sell his interest to a well-educated, highly solvent, but otherwise undesirable person if his presence as a tenant
would cause Buyer and others to abandon their interests to the
financial disaster of the corporation?
THE CONSTITUTIONAL QUESTION

Pertinent to any discussion of discriminatory devices are several
comparatively recent decisions of the Supreme Court of the United
States. In 1947 the Court held in Shelley v. Kraemer 7 that state
courts could not be used to enforce racial restrictive covenants excluding people of the Negro or Mongolian races from ownership or
occupancy of property within a designated housing district. Such a
covenant had been enforced by the Missouri Supreme Court against
the petitioners, who were Negroes. By holding that judicial enforcement of such private agreements through injunction amounts to state
action, the Court struck down the Missouri decision as a violation of
the equal protection clause of the fourteenth amendment. Following
this decision there was widespread speculation as to the probable
success of other methods of enforcing such covenants. Opponents of
Shelley were further frustrated in 1953 by the decision in Barrows v.
Jackson. 2 The respondent broke a covenant restricting purchase or
occupancy of certain described real property to persons of the Caucasian race. The Supreme Court held that the Shelley rule also prohibited a court's awarding damages against a covenantor for breaching
a restrictive covenant. By spiking this indirect effort to enforce racial
restrictive covenants, the Court effectively shattered a long-standing
precedent that the equal protection clause of the fourieenth amendment was a prohibition on the states alone and not on actions of
private individuals.29
27334 U.S. 1 (1947), 1 U. FLA. L. RV. 453 (1948); see Note, 11 U. FLA. L. REv.
344 (1958).

28346 U.S. 249 (1953).

28But see Dorsey v. Stuyvesant Town Corp., 299 N.Y. 512, 87 N.E.2d 541 (1949),
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In order to evaluate the probable effect of these decisions, several
extralegal realities warrant consideration. For example, Southern
repugnance to recent civil rights decisions must be evaluated; and
the result of a ruling amenable to Shelley, if applied in the South to
so vulnerable an area as cooperative apartments, must be equally
considered. Such aversions might cause the Supreme Court to hold
in abeyance the full weight of this rule through a process of discreet
distinctions in or a cautious disregard of immediate litigation on
point. Persons recalcitrant to Shelley find a vestige of hope for this
hypothesis in the Court's acknowledgment that it is not the covenants
themselves that are unconstitutional but their enforcement by the
state through acts of the judiciary. The breadth of this acknowledgment was explored in 1955 by the North Carolina judiciary. In
Charlotte Park and Recreation Commission v. Barringer ° a local
grantor deeded to the City of Charlotte Park and the recreation commission land for a recreation park, subject to the condition subsequent that use other than by members of the white race would effect
a reversion to the grantor. By holding that the common law operation
of a fee simple determinable is inherently automatic and independent
of judicial enforcement, the North Carolina Supreme Court ruled
that Shelley did not apply, and a subsequent appeal for a writ of
certiorari to the Supreme Court of the United States was denied?'
Use of this case as a lasting impediment to the doctrine enunciated
in Shelley is not suggested. The case is significant, however, because
it demonstrates that restraints based on race can be formulated on a
thesis more subtle than that of the Shelley case. The extent to which
racial and other bases of discrimination, unlawful when overt, can
persist behind the guise of legitimate-sounding restraints is but a
question of how deeply the Court will probe.
CONCLUSION

Cooperative apartments present a unique and delicate issue for
judicial resolution. The issue is unique in its hybrid combination of
opposing stockhold and leasehold theories. Confined to these sources
alone, the judiciary in the last forty years that cooperative apartments
have existed has evolved no comprehensive answer to Buyer's question.
cert. denied, 339 U.S. 981 (1950).
ao242 N.C. 311, 88 S.E.2d 114 (1955). See generally Notes, 34 N.C.L. REV. 113
(1955); 32 N.C.L. REV. 106 (1953).
31350 U.S. 983 (1956).
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Penthouse, arguendo, applied the arbitrary rule of leases. Weisner
later denied this rationale, implying that each restraint would be judicially inspected for its own reasonableness. Yet this same decision
gave no definition of "reasonable." The dissent in Weisner, however,
suggests that the legitimate business needs of cooperative apartments
may be used as a guide. 32 The luxurious nature of these apartments,
for example, makes purchase a response to personal fancy, which, as
suggested earlier, is predicated in many instances upon the presumption that the tenants will be adequately screened. Should the courts
disturb this presumption, argues Seller, the market would collapse.
The shadow of Shelley v. Kraemer confuses matters further and
threatens to eclipse any solution that may be worked out in the
compromise of traditional legal formulae. The fact that some decisions seem to circumvent Shelley does not preclude a future holding
that racially restrictive covenants are invalid per se as against public
policy. It is suggested that under the present rule of Weisner and
Shelley some arbitrary restraints will be upheld while others will fail.
To this extent Seller's conclusive assurance to Buyer appears optimistic.
What, then, will be the measure of a reasonable restraint on the
alienation of a cooperative apartment interest? It is likely that it will
be one sympathetic to the exigencies of the cooperative scheme, with
the probable exception of any covenant that ostensibly discriminates
against race or creed. Query: May not the success of this unique
entity necessarily depend upon the use of ostensible discrimination?
W. D.

FREDERICK, JR.

JON C. MoYL.

327

App. Div. 2d 75, 83, 180 N.Y.S.2d 734, 742 (1st Dep't 1958).
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